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are more than negligible, it would seem sound to treat the
situation this same way; that is, to compute the deduction
for the bequests to charity on the basis of what would be
the maximum possible diversion under the standard used
in the trust and the particular circumstances of the case.2"
Under such an approach, some deduction could be allowed
without straining the "so remote as to be negligible" cri-
terion, and still the government would be adequately
protected.
JuLIAN I. JACOBS
Continuing Corporate Liability For Federal Crime
After State Dissolution Of Corporation
Melrose Distillers, Inc. v. United States1
Three corporate defendants - Melrose Distillers, Inc.,
CVA Corporation, and Dant Distillery and Distributing
Corporation - all wholly owned subsidiaries of Schenley
Industries, were indicted for alleged violations of Sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.2 Shortly after the indictment
against them was returned, they were dissolved under
their respective state statutes, (Maryland and Delaware)
and were recreated as divisions of the parent firm. Their
motion for a dismissal of the indictment under the claim
that their dissolution abated the proceedings was denied
by the United States District Court for Maryland, which,
upon the subsequent plea of nolo contendere, levied fines
against them. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed.' On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court, in
turn, affirmed, stating that the three corporations retained
sufficient life under state law to allow these criminal pro-
ceedings to continue, without finding any need to resolve
the exact interpretation of provisions of the state abate-
ment statutes. The Court reasoned: (1) that the Sherman
Act, §8, "defines 'person' to include corporations 'existing'
under the laws of any State", and (2) regardless of how
Maryland and/or Delaware construe their respective stat-
utes allowing dissolved corporations to continue in ex-
istence for "proceedings" already begun (narrowly, so as
to preclude subsequent state criminal prosecutions, or
2 LOWNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES (1956) 366.
1359 U.S. 271 (1959).
226 STAT. 209, §§ 1, 2; 15 U.S.C.A. (1951), §§ 1, 2
'258 F. 2d 726 (1958), Rec. Dec. 19 Md. L. Rev. 82 (1959).
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broadly, so as to include them), the corporation was "an
'existing' enterprise for the purposes of §8".4 The Supreme
Court as a policy matter concluded:
"Petitioners were wholly owned subsidiaries of Schen-
ley Industries, Inc. After dissolution they simply be-
came divisions of a new corporation under the same
ultimate ownership. In this situation there is no more
reason for allowing them to escape criminal penalties
then damages in civil suits. As the Court of Appeals
noted, a corporation cannot be sent to jail. The dis-
charge of its liabilities whether criminal or civil can
be effected only by the payment of money. '
A basic question presented by the case was whether
an analogy exists between the death of a natural person
and the dissolution of a corporation; and, if so, whether
the legal consequences and ramifications are identical. The
Supreme Court itself, in three prior decisions ranging from
1927 to 1949 had taken the position that, at common law,
dissolution and death are analogous as to the abatement
of liability.6 In each of these three cases, as well as three
others decided in the lower Federal courts,' the principle
that only a statute enacted in the state of incorporation
can sustain sufficient life in a dissolved corporation to ren-
der it liable in its transformed state, had been followed
without exception. Chief Justice Taft expressed this ma-
jority rule quite clearly in stating:
"It is well settled that at common law and in the
Federal jurisdiction a corporation which has been dis-
solved is as if it did not exist, and the result of its dis-
solution cannot be distinguished from the death of a
natural person in its effect."8
'359 U.S. 271, 273-274 (1959).5 Ibid., 274.
4 Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. State of Oklahoma, 273 U.S. 257 (1927);
Defense Supplies Corp. v. Lawrence Warehouse Co., 336 U.S. 31 (1949);
Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Forty-One Thirty-Six Wilcox Building Corp.,
302 U.S. 120 (1937).
'U.S. v. Line Material Co., 202 F. 2d 929 (6th Cir. 1953) ; U.S. v. U.S.
Vanadium Corp., Electro-Metallurgical Co. and Electro-Metallurgical Sales
Corp., 230 F. 2d 646 (10th Cir. 1956); cert. den. 76 S. Ct. 836 (1956);
U.S. v. Leche, 44 F. Supp. 765 (D.C. La. 1942).8Oklahoma Natural Gas Co v. State of Oklahoma, 8upra, n. 6, 259. The
existence of contrary holdings is admitted by the Court in a later case, in
which, though siding with the majority, the Court stated that the analogy
has "not been the subject of universal admiration . . . and is by no means
exact". Defense Supplies Corp. v. Lawrence Warehouse Co., supra, n. 6,
634. The Appellate Division of the New York Court has adopted this
minority view. Wilson v. Brown, 175 N.Y.S. 688, 692 (1919).
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Proceeding from this principle, there is virtual unanim-
ity in looking to the state statutes for changes in the com-
mon law rule. The states, however, are far from uniform
in their statutory treatment of the problem; for, not only
do the provisions themselves vary, but, in some cases, the
same thought is expressed in different ways, leading to
divergent interpretations. Under the Delaware statute, for
example, a dissolved corporation continues in existence
for a period of three years from its official expiration for
the purpose of prosecuting or defending "suits, actions and
proceedings" to which it is a litigant. The statute prolongs
the life of such a corporation until judgment or decree is
granted in cases where certain types of litigation were
commenced by or against the firm either prior to or within
the three year period.9
In Maryland, the effect of dissolution was expressed
quite clearly in Section 78 (a) of the 1951 Code, which
stated that dissolution shall not abate "any pending suit
or proceeding by or against the corporation, and all such
suits may be continued with such substitution of parties,
if any, as the Court directs."'10 In addition to the afore-
mentioned section, the Court in the instant case cited Sec-
tion 72 (b) of the 1951 Code, which provides that, although
the dissolution of a corporation is effective when the arti-
cles of dissolution are accepted for record by the State Tax
Commission, the firm nevertheless remains in existence
for the purposes of "paying, satisfying, and discharging any
existing debts and obligations ... and doing all other acts
required to liquidate and wind up its business and affairs.""
As to Section 78 (a), since the clarity and directness
of the statute's wording left little doubt as to its intent, the
Court concerned itself only with the interpretation as to
what forms of litigation were to be included under it, the
problem being centered on the construction of the words
"suit" and "proceeding." The question on point was
whether these words have sufficient latitude to encompass
criminal prosecution.
There has been little doubt but that civil litigation does
not abate under the statutes, both in the Federal and State
Courts. Only six days prior to the Melrose decision, the
Maryland Court of Appeals, in Baltimore County v. Glen-
dale Corporation, wherein a suit for specific performance
of certain contracts was brought, stated unequivocably that
98 DEL. CODE (1935) § 42.
'°MD. CODE (1951), Art. 23, § 78(a) ; Cf. MD. CODE (1957), Art. 23, § 82(a).
"MD. CODE (1951), Art. 23, § 72(b) ; (1957), Art. 23, § 76(b).
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the mere fact of dissolution would not affect the civil lia-
bility of the defendant corporation. 12
As to whether the words include criminal prosecution,
a marked conflict exists among the courts. Taking the
words "suit," "proceeding," and "action" together in a
series, as they appear in the Delaware Code, the Circuit
Court for the Tenth Circuit decided, in an oft-cited opinion,
that they include only civil litigation, reasoning that crim-
inal prosecution, being different in nature and not being
specifically mentioned, was not intended to be included
in the exceptions to the common law.13 Although abating
the cause before it, the Court was faced with a case similar
to Baltimore County v. Glendale,'4 in that the action was
not actually pending at the time of the defendant's dis-
solution; and its decision may be distinguished from those
contrary to it in that respect.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reached the same conclusion, however, finding that, al-
though "action" and "proceeding" may explain "suit" they
do not expand its meaning sufficiently to warrant continua-
tion of criminal prosecutions. 5
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit took issue
with this reasoning, stating:
"We agree that the word 'suit' or the word 'action'
standing alone might reasonably be held as not in-
cluding a criminal prosecution, but when the word
'proceeding' is added we think a combination is pre-
sented which is well near inclusive of all forms of
litigation."'16
In documenting its interpretation, the Court referred to
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, in which the
term "criminal proceeding" is used.17 Also cited by the
Court is an opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit which, in construing the more controversial Dela-
ware law, agreed that the word "proceeding" is broader
than "action" or "suit," and, to fulfill the raison d'etre of
the statute, must be given full latitude. 8
219 Md. 465, 150 A. 2d 433 (1959).
's U.S. v. Safeway Stores, 140 F. 2d 834 (10th Cir. 1944).
,Supra, n. 12.
"U.S. v. Line Material Co., 202 F. 2d 929 (6th Cir. 1953).
1 U.S. v. P. F. Collier and Son Corp., 208 F. 2d 936, 939, 40 A.L.R. 2d
1389 (Cir. 1953).
17 18 U.S.C.A. (1948), Rule 2.
Is Bahen and Wright, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 176 F.
2d 538, 539 (4th Cir. 1949).
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In the instant case below, the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit felt that the words of the statutes of
both Maryland and Delaware, for purposes of survival of
criminal suits, should include criminal as well as Civil
proceedings, and adopting the same policy approach as
the Supreme Court in the language quoted above said that
to exempt the survival of criminal actions "would offend
our sense of justice, pervert the obvious policy of the state
in enacting these survival statutes, and provide an easy
avenue of escape by corporations from the consequences of
their criminal acts by the easy process of dissolution."'19
The controversy concerning this technical interpreta-
tion of the three words, in so far as a federal criminal pro-
ceedings involving Maryland or Delaware corporations are
concerned, was, apparently ended when the Supreme Court
decided in the Melrose case that, "under both the Mary-
land and Delaware law the lives of these corporations were
not cut short, as is sometimes done on dissolution ... but
were sufficiently continued so that this proceeding did not
abate. ''20
However, it should be observed that a question is neces-
sarily raised as to whether the interpretation of the Mary-
land law by the Court of Appeals (the Supreme Court, as
indicated above did not rest on the interpretation below)
in this decision would still be applicable; for, though too
late to affect this case, the State Legislature has repealed
Section 78 (a), apparently intending it to be replaced by
Rule 222 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure.21
While the Reporter's note to Rule 222 indicates that no
change in meaning from Section 78 (a) was intended, a
problem arises because the Rule omits the words "suit"
and "proceeding", which had been used in the statute, and
merely states that an "action" shall not abate by reason
of dissolution. In Rule 5 (a), stating definitions applicable
throughout the Maryland Rules "action" is defined as not
including a criminal proceeding.22 Thus, whereas Section
78 (a) prevented abatement of "any pending suit or pro-
ceeding", which was susceptible of construction to include
criminal proceedings, as accepted by the United States
Court of Appeals below in the instant case,2" Rule 222 ap-
plies by definition only to civil litigation.
1258 F. 2d 726, 728 (4th Cir. 1958).
"Melrose Distillers, Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 271, 272-73 (1959).
21 Maryland Rules of Procedure, Rule 222 (1958).
0Ibid., Rule 5(a).
2Supra, circa n. 4.
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Unless this situation is corrected, by re-enacting the
repealed portion of Section 78 (a), preferably with an
amendment to specifically include criminal proceedings, or
perhaps by adoption of a rule specifically related to abate-
ment of proceedings against corporations as part of the
new criminal rules,24 the effect of dissolution of a Mary-
land corporation on abatement of state criminal proceed-
ings would seem to become once again an unresolved prob-
lem, and also to suggest the possibility of further dispute
in federal prosecutions.
From the strong expressions of policy quoted above from
the Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals
below in the instant case,25 it would seem probable that the
federal courts, even without further change in the Mary-
land statutes or rules, would take the liberal policy ap-
proach which the Supreme Court took in construing the
Sherman Act in the instant case.
However, there can be little doubt that some clarifica-
tion of the state situation in the manner suggested above,
whether by statutes or rule, would be desirable. Possibly,
consideration should be given also to the desirability of a
provision for survival of corporations for purposes of any
criminal liability for the period of limitations specified for
any particular crime, whether or not proceedings had been
started before dissolution.
AIAN M. WILNE
The Effect Of The Interrogatory Form On
The Sufficiency Of The Answer
Britt v. Snyder1
The plaintiffs in this case are the widower and the two
infant children of a patient who died as a result of an
operation performed at the South Baltimore General Hos-
pital. In a suit to recover damages for alleged malpractice
against two physicians - a surgeon and an anaesthetist -
and the hospital, the plaintiff submitted the following in-
terrogatory to each of the defendants individually: "Give
a concise statement of the facts upon which you base your
"Currently in the form of a Tentative Draft (February, 1960) as pre-
pared by a subcommittee of the Rules Committee of the Oourt of Appeals
of Maryland and circulated to the Bench and Bar for comment.
Supra, circa ns. 4 and 19.
1DAiLY RECORD, July 23, 1959 (Md. 1959).
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